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Drafted:Pol-Mil:AMarley  
Cleared:Charge:JLeader

SUBJECT: Meeting of Charge d'Affaires with UN SRSG; No Bend in the GoR

1. Summary: Charge d'Affaires met with the UN Special Representative on 16 August to discuss the transition of responsibility for security in the Humanitarian Protected Zone. Late on 15 August, the Rwandan President informed the UN SRSG that it was not willing to extend the timeframe for the withdrawal of the French. End Summary.

2. Charge d'Affaires Joyce Leader met with UN Special Representative Khan on 16 August to learn the results of his talks with Rwandan leaders on 15 August as a follow-up to demarches made by Ambassador Rawson concerning the need for GoR flexibility and cooperation in the Humanitarian Protection Zone.

3. In separate meetings with the Prime Minister and the Vice President, Mr. Khan confirmed the Government's willingness to be flexible concerning the possibility of extending the timeframe for the withdrawal of the French troops from the Protected Zone. In both meetings he stressed the utility of extending the withdrawal deadline as allowing additional time for the GoR to convey its message to the population in the zone, as well as enhancing the transition process by increasing the overlap period in which French troops would patrol jointly with the Ethiopian soldiers as a confidence building measure for the populace.

4. Vice President Kagame, after relating the normal litany of complaints about the French, told the SRSG that a one week extension would be "no problem" if it would help UNAMIR. Prime Minister Twagiramungu was even stronger in his denunciation of the French, but also agreed to an extension.

5. At 9:00 PM on the 15th the SRSG was taken to meet with President Bizimungu, where he was told that the Rwandan Government had decided that it could not support any extension in the withdrawal timetable. The President told the SRSG that he knew the UNAMIR forces would not be "100 percent" by the 21 August changeover date, but that at least the UN is a positive force for Rwanda, while the French continue to be a negative influence on stability and security in Rwanda. The SRSG commented that he believes the "Hutu converts" (the Prime Minister, who is from Cyangugu and the Interior Minister, from Kibuye) had proven stronger than the "Tutsi moderates" on this issue.

6. The SRSG said that his argument for more time was weakened by the unexpected arrival of the first contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers on the afternoon of the 15th. He indicated that approximately 300 Ethiopians were in Kigali by noon on the 16th.

There was no housing available for those who had arrived, and more were on the way. The Force Commander plans to send the Ethiopians on to Cyangugu by road as soon as possible.

7. In response to a query concerning UN planning if the transition timing can not be extended, Mr. Khan said that he was optimistic that UNAMIR could successfully take over the area. With the arrival of the Ethiopians, it can now numerically match the French Turquoise force man for man. The UN (UNAMIR with WFP and WHO) will carry out a deliberate and coordinated campaign to ensure that food, water and medical supplies arrive simultaneously with peacekeepers. The current effort to flush the southwest of Rwanda with NGO presence will be expanded even further. The UN and GOR will continue to conduct high level visits to talk to the people in the region. "Contact Committees" representing displaced within the HPZ and refugees in Zaire would be transported, escorted and protected by UNAMIR troops on visits to Kigali and/or their home areas to ascertain the security situation. Finally, the UN is trying to get mobile radio transmitting stations which it will deploy at the eastern end of the Nyungwe Forest to advise the populace that there is no security need for them to move westward.

8. Mr. Khan stated that in his meeting with the Vice President, Kagame said that the GoR has to date, been fully cooperative concerning requests made to it by the USG and the UN. They agreed to allow the African participants in Operation Turquoise (Senegal, Chad, and Congo) to remain in Rwanda as part of UNAMIR following the French withdrawal from the HPZ. The Government has also agreed to stay out of the HPZ and allow the UN to provide security there. The SRSG said that he believed Kagame then implied a clear warning: if/if Interhamwe militia or officials of the ex-regime continue to conduct looting, intimidation or violence in the area following the withdrawal of the French and despite the best efforts of UNAMIR, then the RPA would have to go into the zone and put a halt to such activities.

9. The SRSG then turned to the subject of U.S. assistance for Rwanda. Following complimentary remarks about U.S. efforts, Mr. Khan stated that UNICEF has 24 vehicles in Nairobi which needed to be flown into Kigali and asked that the USAF provide assistance. The SRSG agreed to ask UNREO to identify the UNICEF vehicles as an airflow priority after learning that the U.S. is using UNREO as the lead agency concerning the priority of needs among NGOs and UN agencies competing for airlift.

10. The Special Representative concluded the meeting by musing on the requirement in such UN operations to have a bit of liquid capital on hand for decisive use in support of the mission. Using the need for a radio to counter the extremist propaganda as an example, Mr. Khan said that the requirement for such a radio has been known for six weeks. Germany, Japan, the U.S., the British and UNDP have all promised to look into it, but no one has yet delivered. The British sent a radio consultant, but no radio. Within three weeks, the success or failure of the transition in

southwestern Rwanda will have occurred without benefit of such a radio to influence the outcome. For \$200K, the SRSG could simply buy such a transmitter and place it into operation. At the donor pledging conference in Geneva \$440 million had been pledged to assist Rwanda, but no funding has been provided up front. The SRSG believes that if even 1 percent of the pledged funding were made available for contingency use, it could significantly enhance the chances of success for the peace effort.

11. Comment: The SRSG indicated that following his meetings with Kagame and Twagiramungu he reported to UN Headquarters in New York that the GoR would be willing to extend the mandate of Turquoise by 1-2 weeks if/if the UN requested it to, and that he thought such an extension would be useful to help prevent a "blowout" of refugees to Bukavu. He, in turn, was told that the French would stay only if/if the GoR asked that they do so. With the arrival of the Ethiopians and the GoR decision not to allow the French to stay longer, the SRSG now believes that UNAMIR can successfully carry out its security mission in the southwest and that the issue of an extension of timeline is moot. Khan feels he made a good faith effort to get the GoR to support such an extension, and he has no intentions (at this time) to pursue the matter further. End Comment.